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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
Workers bear significant costs during unemployment. Unemployment risk is a substantial concern 
for workers: those who are laid-off often endure significant reductions in consumption (Gruber, 1997), 
long delays before reemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990), and significant wage cuts after returning to 
work (Farber, 2005; and Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Displaced workers also suffer psychological and social 
costs (Kalil and Ziol-Guest, 2008; and Kalil and DeLeire, 2010). Workers’ concerns about becoming 
unemployed reduce their labor supply (Brown and Matsa, 2012) and affect firms’ policies on layoffs and 
wage setting, even when they are far from bankruptcy (Topel, 1983, 1984; Li, 1986; and Hamermesh, and 
Wolfe 1990). Despite their magnitude, however, workers’ costs of unemployment are largely absent from 
theories in corporate finance, which typically do not emphasize labor market frictions.  
This paper studies the impact of worker unemployment costs on corporate financing decisions. 
Building on theories by Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010), we develop and examine 
the hypothesis that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of mitigating worker 
exposure to unemployment risk.1  Workers require that firms provide a premium in wages or benefits as 
compensation for potential job loss (Topel, 1984; and Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981). Firms can choose 
financial policies that decrease the risk of financial distress and costly layoffs, which implicitly reduce the 
amount of compensation that workers require to offset unemployment risk. Diminished exposure to 
unemployment risk through flexible financial policy is likely to be especially important in industries that 
experience relatively high layoff separation rates and tight financing constraints, as workers in these 
industries are more likely to experience job loss caused by distress.  
1 As put by Stewart Myers, “To succeed a corporation requires a co-investment of financial capital from 
the outside and human capital that is built up inside the business. . . . When you ask people to make an 
investment of human capital in your firm, you do not then do things—like raising the leverage ratio too 
high—that would needlessly put that investment at risk” (Myers, McConnell, Peterson, Soter, and Stern, 
1998, pp. 18–19).  
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Empirical identification of the impact of workers’ exposure to unemployment risk on corporate 
financing decisions is challenging for two reasons. The first obstacle is the precise measurement of 
workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. The second difficulty is distinguishing the impact of worker 
unemployment costs from other factors that otherwise impact financial policy, such as unobservable 
investment opportunities. Correlations between leverage and proxies for unemployment risk, such as firm 
size, capital intensity, and wages, are suggestive but open to many interpretations (Verwijmeren and 
Derwall, 2010; and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2009).  
To overcome these challenges, we exploit changes in state unemployment insurance (UI) benefit 
laws and examine their relation with the corporate financial policies of US firms from 1950 to 2008. 
Increases in UI benefits impact corporate financing through their impact on workers’ exposure to 
unemployment risk. More generous state unemployment benefits make layoffs less costly and reduce 
workers’ demands that they be compensated by their employers for facing high unemployment risk 
(Topel, 1984). Because firms have less incentive to use conservative financial policy to reduce worker 
exposure to job loss, they are able to raise leverage and profit from increased debt tax shields and other 
benefits associated with debt financing.  
Our approach enables us to identify the impact of shocks to unemployment risk on corporate 
financial policies without requiring explicit measures of worker risk aversion to unemployment. Legally 
mandated increases in unemployment insurance payments reduce the costs workers face when 
unemployed. Indeed, UI compensation has economically meaningful effects on workers’ behavior and on 
aggregate labor supply (e.g., Topel and Welch, 1980; Topel, 1984; Meyer, 1990, 1995; Meyer and Mok, 
2007; and Gormley, Liu, and Zhou, 2010). We verify that increases in state UI benefit generosity are 
associated with greater state UI payouts and thus provide meaningful shocks to workers’ exposure to 
unemployment risk.  
Increases in the generosity of state unemployment insurance benefits are associated with higher 
firm leverage and lower interest coverage ratios. A doubling of the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with firms maintaining 4.5 percentage points greater average ratios of debt to assets and 15%  
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lower interest coverage. These relations are empirically robust. The inclusion of controls for firm fixed 
effects implies that the results reflect average, within-firm changes in capital structure when states 
increase the generosity of their UI systems. Controls for year fixed effects account for concomitant 
national trends. We also include a variety of controls for firm financial characteristics and state economic 
conditions to ensure that the results are not driven by firm-level variation in performance or 
macroeconomic factors. The results are also robust to various alternate measures of UI benefit generosity. 
The relation between UI benefits and leverage becomes even stronger when we exclude firms that have a 
geographically dispersed workforce for which we are likely to measure eligible UI benefits with error. 
The identification assumption central to the causal interpretation of these findings is that residual 
variation in UI benefits—after controlling for a number of factors, such as local economic conditions and 
firm characteristics—is uncorrelated with unobservable covariates that affect corporate leverage. An 
important concern that we evaluate in great detail is the possibility that unobserved variation in 
investment opportunities, or other factors that are not captured by our control variables, could explain 
changes in both UI benefits and firm leverage decisions. To evaluate the extent to which our estimates are 
biased by such unobserved heterogeneity, we perform a number of analyses. Collectively, the results of 
these analyses indicate that our findings are best explained through the channel of unemployment risk on 
corporate financing choices.  
First, we show that the relation between UI generosity and leverage is particularly stark for 
subsamples of firms whose workers face greater expected unemployment costs. The relation is especially 
pronounced for firms in industries in which workers face greater risk of unemployment, such as industries 
with production technologies characterized by greater labor intensity and industries that experience 
frequent layoffs. Consistent with UI benefits being most beneficial for liquidity constrained workers 
(Browning and Crossley, 2001; Bloeman and Stancanelli, 2005; Chetty, 2008; and Berk and Walden, 
2010), the relation is also stronger for firms in industries that employ more low-wage workers and 
employees who do not own a home. Workers also vary in the speed with which they are able to secure 
reemployment after job loss because of either heterogeneous search costs or firm-specific human capital; 
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workers who can quickly find employment after job loss often do not take any UI benefits (Anderson and 
Meyer, 1997). Consistent with employers of frequent UI recipients being more apt to consider UI law 
changes when making capital structure decisions, financing decisions in industries with many low-wage 
workers and frequent UI recipients are especially sensitive to changes in UI benefit laws. 
Second, we find a stronger relation between UI generosity and leverage among firms that face 
tighter financing constraints, as measured by firm size, the absence of dividend payments, and low 
operating cash flows. Tight financing constraints make it difficult for firms to raise capital if they 
experience a negative shock, which raises the probability that such firms must resort to cost cutting 
through layoffs or reductions in wages and benefits (Ofek, 1993; and John, Lang, and Netter, 1992). 
Workers in these firms are, therefore, likely to face greater unemployment risk, and increases in UI 
generosity should have a greater impact on the financial policies of these firms, as we show.  
Third, we test a number of implications of alternate hypotheses that would suggest that our 
estimates reflect an endogenous, instead of a causal, link between unemployment risk and corporate 
leverage. We examine the timing of the relation between UI benefit changes and financial leverage and 
find that changes in leverage appear only after (not before) changes in UI benefit laws. This pattern 
indicates that the relation is not attributable to the generosity of UI benefit laws simply responding to 
worsening economic conditions or increases in corporate leverage. Furthermore, an unobservable 
variable, related to poor investment opportunities or poor unobservable economic conditions, would 
manifest in poor firm performance, but we instead find that firms show no signs of unusually low 
operating profits when residual benefits increase.  We also show that the financing decisions of firms that 
generate most of their revenue from national commerce (and are, hence, unlikely to be driven by 
unobserved, local economic shocks) exhibit large, if not larger, sensitivities to UI laws than do firms that 
generate most of their sales from local, intrastate markets. Furthermore, as a falsification test, we show 
that bordering states’ UI benefit levels, which would also be affected by regional economic conditions, 
are not correlated with firms’ leverage. Additional tests, described later, reinforce a causal interpretation 
of the findings.  
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We also explore the empirical relevance of two alternate mechanisms that could potentially 
explain the observed link between UI benefits and leverage. One possibility is that increases in UI 
benefits raise firms’ UI premiums and other costs, leaving them with less money to pay back debt. 
However, when we examine the impact of increases in UI benefits on operating performance, we find that 
increases in UI benefits are not associated with decreases in performance. A second possibility is that 
unemployment insurance impacts the ability of unionized workers to bargain with management for higher 
wages, and in response, firms choose aggressive financial policies to toughen their bargaining position. 
We find, however, that the relation between UI generosity and financial policies is just as strong for firms 
with low union coverage.  
Finally, we provide numerical estimates of the total indirect costs of financial distress due to 
unemployment risk. Although UI benefits provide substantial compensation to unemployed workers, they 
do not fully account for all costs borne by workers during layoff spells. Using data on employment 
changes for firms in default and estimates from Topel (1984) on the amount of compensation tied to 
unemployment risk, we estimate that the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress that are due to 
unemployment risk compensation are large. An average BBB-rated firm pays workers about 60 basis 
points of the firm’s value to bear the layoff risk that is due to financial distress. For comparison, these 
costs explain nearly 90% of the difference between the tax benefits and risk-adjusted ex post costs of 
financial distress calculated by Almeida and Philippon (2007).  
The central contribution of this paper is to provide novel empirical evidence that worker 
unemployment risk significantly impacts firms’ corporate financial policies. The findings indicate that 
managers choose financial policy partly as a means of mitigating labor’s exposure to unemployment risk. 
More broadly, the evidence suggests that frictions in labor markets affect corporate financial policies, a 
phenomenon of growing interest as human capital becomes an increasingly critical asset for firms 
(Zingales, 2000). This paper adds to a growing literature that analyzes the interactions between labor 
economics and finance (including Matsa, 2010; Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez, 2012; and Chen, 
Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina, 2011). Whereas those papers examine leverage as a strategic input in the 
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bargaining process between workers and firms, our paper examines a unique channel through which 
financial policy is used to mitigate the costs borne by workers as the result of involuntary unemployment. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Workers bear significant costs when they become involuntarily unemployed. These costs could 
result from costly job search (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 1986; and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), 
layoff discouragement effects (Jahoda, 1982), a limited supply of match-specific job opportunities 
(Lazear, 2003), imperfect information about worker productivity (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982), or other 
labor market frictions. Whatever the underlying cause, the impact of these costs on worker and firm 
behavior is significant and has been studied extensively in labor economics. Given the high costs of 
unemployment, a number of theoretical and empirical papers find that workers require compensation in 
the form of higher wages, additional benefits, and improved working conditions to compensate for 
unemployment risk. These payments are commonly referred to as compensating wage differentials.  
The idea that wage differentials must compensate workers for bearing unemployment risk dates 
back to 18th century Scottish economist Adam Smith (1976, p. 120): 
 
The wages of labor in different occupations vary with the constancy or inconstancy of 
employment. . . .What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain 
him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding 
moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion. . . .The 
high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the recompense of their skill, as 
the compensation for the inconstancy of their employment. 
 
A number of theoretical papers formalize this idea and posit that workers face nontrivial costs of job 
mobility that impose constraints on short-run labor supply. Firms must compensate workers ex ante to 
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bear these risks because they cannot fully commit to insuring workers against these costs (Abowd and 
Ashenfelter, 1981; Topel, 1984; Li, 1986; Rosen, 1986; and Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990). The risks—
and, thus, the size of the compensation—increase with the probability of unemployment, the degree of 
worker risk aversion, the duration of job loss, and the costs incurred by workers during unemployment 
spells. 
A variety of empirical evidence supports the importance of compensating wage differentials for 
unemployment risk. Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) find that compensating differentials for 
unemployment risk vary across industries and are large (up to 14% of total wages) in the presence of 
significant unemployment risk. Topel (1984) estimates that a percentage point increase in anticipated 
unemployment raises an individual’s wage by about 1% in the presence of mean UI wage replacement. Li 
(1986) and Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990) find that 14-41% of total interindustry wage differentials can 
be explained by differences in unemployment risk.  
Compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk are likely to affect firms’ financing 
policies. Financial leverage affects a firm’s probability of entering distress and, hence, impacts workers’ 
exposures to layoff risk, because distressed firms are often forced to lay off workers in order to meet 
outstanding debt obligations (Ofek, 1993; and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein. 1994). Increasing 
leverage can, therefore, raise the costs that are required to compensate workers for bearing greater 
exposure to the risk of financial distress and unemployment.  
These considerations can be understood as an additional term in the trade-off weighed by firms 
when taking on additional leverage: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] ExpenseLaborDistressFinancialofCostsNPVShieldTaxNPVIssueDebtNPV ∆++= . (1) 
In the traditional trade-off theory of capital structure, a firm that issues debt balances the value obtained 
from debt tax shields with the potential value lost should the debt cause the firm to encounter financial 
distress (for example, see Graham, 2000). The net present value (NPV) of the costs of financial distress is 
the product of the probability of financial distress times the magnitude of appropriately discounted, ex 
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post direct and indirect costs of distress.  
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical support for the inclusion of an additional 
term in the adjusted present value equation that typically characterizes the trade-off theory of capital 
structure. Because debt financing increases the probability of layoffs in distress, it raises the 
compensation that workers require today to bear increased unemployment risk. While costs of financial 
distress typically refer to ex post costs that are realized if the firm eventually becomes financially 
distressed, the final term in Eq. (1) represents costs paid ex ante because of labor market frictions.2   
Workers’ demands for higher wages, when their firms take on increased financial risk, do not 
require that workers directly observe firms’ leverage decisions. The impact of leverage on unemployment 
risk is likely to be manifest in informative signals from coworkers, management, the media, and from 
other aspects of the economic environment. Using survey responses, Brown and Matsa (2012) find that 
job seekers accurately perceive firms’ financial health. If outside job seekers can perceive such changes in 
distress risk, the firm’s employees likely perceive these changes as well. The evidence that compensating 
wage differentials do in fact respond empirically to unemployment risk further supports this conclusion 
(Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Topel, 1984; Li, 1986; and Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990). 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we examine changes in workers’ unemployment insurance 
benefits as shocks to the final term in Eq. (1). Because unemployment is less costly when workers are 
eligible for more generous UI benefits, they require a lower compensating differential per unit of layoff 
risk. For example, Topel (1984) finds that unemployment insurance significantly reduces wage premiums 
for unemployment risk and estimates that the full replacement of wages by UI payments would cause 
compensating wage premiums to decline to zero. The reduced wage premiums enable firms to raise 
2 Leverage can impose ex ante costs on the firm through the product market as well. For example, Titman 
(1984) and Opler and Titman (1994) argue that high leverage potentially reduces sales of long-lived 
goods because customers that anticipate a bankruptcy liquidation expect higher costs of parts and 
servicing. 
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leverage and gain from increased debt tax shields, lower managerial agency costs, and other benefits 
associated with debt financing.  
 
3. Institutional background 
The unemployment insurance system of the United States provides temporary income to eligible 
workers who become involuntarily unemployed. Under the joint federal-state system, created by Congress 
in 1935, the basic framework for insurance provision is common nationwide, but each state has the 
autonomy to set a number of the program’s parameters, including the amount of benefits paid to 
unemployed workers. 
Each state’s unemployment insurance benefits has three key features: eligibility, wage benefit 
amounts, and duration. Typically, all private sector workers who are involuntarily unemployed and 
actively seeking new employment are eligible for benefits. The wage benefit provided to an eligible 
worker is set in accordance with formulas that are determined by state law. A state’s wage benefit formula 
typically calculates the highest earnings realized by the worker in four of the last five quarters and seeks 
to replace approximately 50% of those wages through weekly payments, subject to minimum and 
maximum bounds. Much of the variation in insurance benefits, across states and over time, stems from 
changes to the maximum bounds. States also vary in the duration of time for which the claimant is 
eligible to receive weekly payments. 
Unemployment insurance provisions are mostly financed by taxes assessed on eligible firms and 
aggregated over time into individual state trust funds. Currently, almost all firms that employ at least one 
worker for 20 weeks and maintain minimal levels of base wage payments are subject to unemployment 
insurance taxes. Tax rates are experience rated, that is, firms with a history of more worker 
unemployment claims pay higher tax rates. When a claimant files for UI benefits, payments are first made 
by state governments. After states exhaust their resources or hit certain rates of aggregate unemployment, 
they are eligible to tap into federal funds for additional support. 
A number of factors lead to variation in unemployment insurance benefits across states and over 
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time (Blaustein, 1993). Underlying economic conditions play a critical role. For example, the degree of a 
state’s industrial urbanization, underlying trends in local unemployment rates, and higher average wage 
levels are commonly associated with benefit increases. A number of noneconomic factors also affect 
changes in UI benefits. Political forces, such as reelection concerns by incumbent officials, haggling and 
logrolling within legislative bodies, party preferences, and lobbying efforts by various constituencies, 
have historically been important determinants of many UI law changes.  
Several historical episodes illustrate that various factors, unrelated to economic conditions, affect 
changes in unemployment insurance laws. For example, in 2002, California passed its first increase in 
unemployment benefits in more than a decade. Amid economic fluctuations during the prior ten years, the 
maximum weekly benefit was held constant at $230. In 2002, the maximum weekly benefit was raised to 
$330. The increase in UI benefits appeared timed with year-end gubernatorial elections as it bolstered 
political support for the governor’s reelection (Kiplinger California Letter, 2001; and Oakland Tribune, 
2002). In another instance, New York increased its UI benefits by 36% in 1990, the first increase in five 
years. The long delay and eventual large adjustment were tied to political haggling over unrelated 
workers’ compensation and other laws (New York Times, 1989). As a third example, Maine increased its 
maximum UI benefits by approximately 12% in 2000. The increase appeared to be unrelated to the 
prevailing economic climate. Instead, the change was described as overdue legislation delayed as the 
state’s Labor Committee faced unrelated, more immediate issues (Portland Press Herald, 1999; and 
Bangor Daily News, 1999).  
UI benefits have a substantial impact on unemployed workers. Gruber (1997) finds that 
unemployment insurance provides significant consumption smoothing benefits to workers. In the absence 
of unemployment insurance, Gruber estimates that consumption would fall by one-third. Gormley, Liu, 
and Zhou (2010) conclude that unemployment insurance impacts workers’ personal savings and 
investment decisions. Increases in unemployment insurance benefits also affect workers’ searches for new 
employment and the durations of their unemployment spells (Topel and Welch, 1980; Moffitt, 1985; 
Meyer, 1990, 1995; and Meyer and Mok, 2007). The impact of UI benefits on unemployed workers, in 
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turn, appears to have significant effects on firms. For example, managers are more willing to lay off 
workers when benefits improve and workers face lower costs of unemployment (Topel, 1983).    
Changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits thus provide meaningful shocks to 
the cost to workers of being laid off. We use these shocks, which feature substantial heterogeneity across 
states and over time, to examine whether firms account for workers’ exposure to unemployment risk in 
setting their financial policies. Variation in unemployment insurance laws affects workers’ expected 
outcomes in unemployment without directly impacting the firm itself and, thus, provides a clean setting to 
examine the relation between financial policy and workers’ exposure to unemployment risk.  
 
4. Data and empirical framework 
Raw data suggest that worker unemployment costs affect firm financial policy.  Fig. 1 shows the 
industry-level correlation between layoff propensities and market leverage ratios. The worker layoff 
separation rates are long-run averages from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics “Mass Layoff Statistics” 
(see Appendix A for details), and average market leverage is from Compustat for 2008. The graph shows 
a negative relation between layoff propensities and leverage. The negative relation is consistent with 
greater layoff propensities exposing workers to greater unemployment risk, which, in turn, causes 
managers in these industries to choose conservative financial policies to protect workers from 
unemployment. Similarly, Titman and Wessels (1988) find a positive correlation between voluntary 
employees’ quit rates and firms’ leverage ratios. They conclude that low costs of job loss lead to greater 
voluntary unemployment and allow firms to increase debt financing.  
[Insert Fig. 1 near here.] 
However, the statistical relations between layoffs, quit rates, and capital structure might not 
reflect causal relations. High industry volatility, for example, could lead to both high layoff propensities 
and conservative financial policies. To more precisely measure and identify the impact of worker 
unemployment costs on financial policy, we collect data on state UI benefit laws and firm balance sheet 
characteristics. Information on UI benefits is from the US Department of Labor’s “Significant Provisions 
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of State UI Laws” from 1950 through 2008. These annual publications detail the UI benefit schedules in 
each state. Under each system, eligible claimants receive a weekly benefit payment for a specified 
number of weeks, where the benefit amount and duration are determined by the worker’s employment 
history during a base period. To measure the generosity of each state’s UI system, we focus on the 
product of the maximum benefit amount and the maximum duration allowed.3  The results are robust to 
other specifications for the generosity of the benefit criteria. 
 Summary statistics that describe the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits are presented 
in Table 1. Log max weekly benefit is the natural log of the maximum weekly wage benefit allowance 
given to workers in an average state-year. The average log wage benefit, unadjusted for inflation, is 5.2 
(approximately $186 per week).  Log max duration is the natural log of the maximum number of weeks 
that a state provides unemployment insurance benefits to claimants. The average sample state-year 
amount is 3.3 (approximately 26 weeks). Log max total benefit, the natural log of the maximum number 
of weeks times the maximum weekly benefit amount, provides a proxy for the total UI benefits that a UI 
claimant can receive in a given year (US Congress, US House of Representatives, 2004). Unadjusted for 
inflation, the average of log max total benefit is 8.5 (approximately $4,900 per year). Significant variation 
also exists across states. In 2009, for example, the maximum total benefit over an unemployment spell 
varies from about $6,000 in Mississippi to more than $28,000 in Massachusetts. 
[Insert Table 1 near here.] 
3 Much of the empirical research on UI generosity examines variation across individual workers in the 
ratio of the weekly UI benefit to weekly wages, which is called the wage-replacement ratio. Although the 
wage-replacement ratio naturally derives from theoretical models of job search, it varies relatively little 
either across state programs or over time (Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982). Because our study focuses on 
differences in UI across firms (and we lack employer-employee linked data), we rely on characteristics of 
UI generosity that display significant variation across states and over time. These provisions are also 
directly relevant to policy makers, as they have proven flexible in practice. 
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 The evolution of state UI benefits over time is graphically depicted in Figs. 2 and 3.  Fig. 2 
illustrates relative increases in state maximum UI benefits by decade. Each map corresponds with a 
different decade and displays the quartile of each state’s increase in UI generosity; darker shading 
indicates larger increases in UI benefits. States display significant heterogeneity in relative UI benefit 
trends across decades, and within decades, the variation does not appear to be caused by regional trends. 
The changes in UI benefits are not dominated by a specific group of states. At some point, all states 
experience large changes in UI benefit laws relative to their peers. Fig. 3 plots the distribution of the 
absolute magnitude of the changes in state UI benefit laws over each decade. States typically increase 
their UI generosity by 25–75% over a decade, and much larger increases, such as more than doubling 
maximum total benefits, are not uncommon.  
[Insert Figs. 2 and 3 near here.] 
No indication exists that states change UI benefit laws at the same time that they adopt other laws 
that impact corporate debt capacity. To explore a possible connection, we compare changes in UI 
generosity with changes in state corporate income tax rates, as tax rates are, perhaps, the most important 
drivers of corporate leverage choices. We obtain data on states’ highest marginal corporate income tax 
rate from the US Tax Foundation for the years 2000 to 2009. Although the tax rate and log max total 
benefit display similar amounts of variation across states and over time, the partial correlation between the 
series, after accounting for state and year fixed effects, is only -0.0089 (p ≥ 0.85). The changes in these 
laws thus appear to be unrelated.  
The measures of UI generosity that we construct are reflected in the aggregate realized value of 
UI benefits paid by states. Using annual data on state UI payments from 1969 (the earliest year available) 
through 2008 from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) “Regional Economic Accounts,” we 
regress the natural log of total UI compensation on the benefit criteria previously described, as well as 
controls for macroeconomic conditions and state and year fixed effects. The results, reported in Table 2, 
indicate that the elasticity of maximum total benefits to actual compensation payments is approximately 
0.9. Aggregate payouts are also correlated with states’ maximum weekly benefit amounts and maximum 
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duration periods. The correlations are statistically significant and economically meaningful and robust to 
controls for macroeconomic conditions, as represented by the state unemployment rate (calculated from 
Current Population Survey microdata using state identifiers, available since 1977) and the state gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate (from the BEA). 
[Insert Table 2 near here.] 
To analyze the impact of worker unemployment costs on firms’ financial policies, we combine 
our measures of the generosity of states’ unemployment insurance systems with firms’ balance sheet and 
income statement information from Compustat. The sample includes all firms (excluding financials and 
utilities) with non-missing observations, which amounts to about 14,000 firms and 140,000 firm-years 
over the 1950–2008 period. The financial data are winsorized at 1% tails, and summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1.  
We use panel regression analysis to examine the connection between UI generosity and financial 
policy at the firm-year level. We estimate a typical leverage regression and include the generosity of the 
UI system of the state in which the firm is located as an additional regressor.4  Specifically, let ijtDEBT  
be a measure of financial leverage at firm i  in state j  and year t  and ijtVALUE  represent the market 
value of the firm. We regress 
 isttiistst
ist
ist XBENEFITUIMAXLN
VALUE
DEBT
εωνβα ++++−11 )  (= , (2) 
where the level of debt as a fraction of the firm’s total value is modeled as a function of the log of the 
maximum total unemployment insurance benefit (as previously defined) in the preceding year, a set of 
4 Firms are assigned to a state on the basis of the company’s headquarters location. If some of a firm’s 
plants are located in a different state than the firm’s headquarters, then those plants would be subject to a 
different legal regime. Such mismeasurement could attenuate the results. When we exclude industries 
likely to have a more dispersed workforce (reported later), the magnitude of the estimates increase. 
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controls itX , firm fixed effects iν , and year fixed effects tω . The controls include the financial variables 
commonly included in leverage regressions, namely, the proportion of fixed assets (a proxy for potential 
collateral), market-to-book ratio (investment opportunities), log of sales (firm size), modified Altman Z-
score (probability of bankruptcy), and return on assets (ROA; profitability).5  The firm fixed effects 
ensure that estimates for 1α  reflect actual changes in benefit generosity and leverage over time, not 
simple cross-sectional correlations, and the year fixed effects account for transitory economy-wide 
factors, such as aggregate macroeconomic conditions, that could possibly affect both variables. The term 
itX  also includes the state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate to control for 
contemporaneous local macroeconomic conditions. Summary statistics for these variables are also 
presented in Table 1.  
The estimated standard errors in all regressions are corrected for clustering at the state level. 
Given that the variation in unemployment benefits is at the state level, this clustering method accounts for 
potential time-varying correlations in unobserved factors that affect different firms within the same state 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). This method also corrects for within-firm error term 
correlations over time and is, therefore, more general than firm-level clustering. The findings are robust to 
alternate specifications for the correlation structure of the error terms. The main coefficients of interest 
5 These variables reflect the literature on capital structure, surveyed in Harris and Raviv (1991), and the 
variables included in cross-sectional analysis in Rajan and Zingales (1995). The modified Altman Z-score 
is 
assets total
capital working1.2
assets total
earnings retained1.4
assets total
sales1.0
assets total
 taxesandinterest  before earnings3.3 +++
 
(MacKie-Mason, 1990). As potentially endogenous characteristics of the firms, these controls may fail 
strict exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002), however, the estimate of interest is similar with and without these 
controls, mitigating the relevance of this concern for our conclusions. 
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are economically and statistically significant whether the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
state level, at the firm level, or not at all.  
 
5. Findings 
5.1. Unemployment insurance generosity and corporate borrowing 
The reduced-form relation between UI benefits and leverage is depicted in Fig. 4. The graph 
presents the variables’ deviations from annual averages in the full sample to account for aggregate time 
trends. The results are reported for the six US states with the most Compustat firms. The figure shows a 
positive relation between UI benefit generosity and market leverage. The co-movement of UI benefits and 
leverage is striking, even as different states display vastly different trends in UI benefits.  
[Insert Fig. 4 near here.] 
Regression analysis of the relation between the generosity of unemployment insurance laws and 
corporate borrowing confirm these results. The estimates, reported in Table 3, show that increases in UI 
benefit generosity are associated with increases in financial leverage. The relation is economically 
meaningful and statistically significant: a doubling of the maximum total UI benefit is associated with 4.5 
percentage points greater average market leverage (Panel A, Column 1). Controls for firm and year fixed 
effects ensure that these results reflect average within-firm changes in capital structure when a state 
increases the generosity of its UI system, after accounting for concomitant national economic conditions 
and leverage trends. The findings are also robust to the inclusion of controls for local macroeconomic 
conditions (Column 2).  
[Insert Table 3 near here.] 
Workers are covered by the UI regime in the state in which they work, whereas our empirical 
design measures the UI laws of the state in which their employer is headquartered. This disconnect could 
attenuate our estimates if some of a firm’s workers are located in a different state than the firm’s 
headquarters. To address this issue, we reestimate Eq. (2) after excluding industries in which a large 
percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely, retail, wholesale, and 
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transport. As expected, excluding these industries increases the estimate of 1α  by about a quarter to 5.7 
percentage points (Column 3). Furthermore, the measured impact of UI law changes on corporate 
leverage remains statistically significant when we control for additional firm characteristics (Column 4).    
The findings are also similar across other regression specifications. The results from estimation in 
first-differences indicate that doubling UI benefits leads to a 3.0 percentage point increase in leverage the 
following year (Column 5). The estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level, albeit a bit smaller 
than the fixed effects estimate. First-differences could be smaller because it measures only part of the 
long-run impact of UI benefit changes on leverage. If firms take more than a year to fully adjust to 
changes in labor unemployment risk (because of adjustment costs or other factors), then first differences 
estimates would be attenuated relative to fixed effects (McKinnish 2008).6   
The impact of UI benefits on leverage is also robust to excluding outlier observations. We 
collapse the sample into state-year observations and analyze corporate leverage ratios as a function of UI 
benefit laws in median regressions, weighted by the number of underlying observations.7  The results 
show that doubling UI benefits leads to a 4.0 percentage point increase in leverage for a given state-year 
(Column 6). This estimate indicates that the response to UI laws estimated for the full sample (reported in 
Columns 1–4) is not driven by extreme observations among UI systems or corporate leverage, but rather 
6  Another possible interpretation we consider is whether serial correlation or another form of modeling 
error could explain these differences. We evaluate the importance of such factors by randomly simulating 
UI law changes across sample states and calculating the p-values of our estimates against the distribution 
of simulated coefficient estimates. In each of one thousand simulations, we assign the realized paths of 
state benefit laws to states randomly, so that firms in state A in some simulations are assigned the laws 
from state B, in others the laws from state C, etc. Our results in this framework have similar statistical 
significance to those reported in Table 3.  
7 The standard errors are calculated using the Markov Chain Marginal Bootstrap method and two hundred 
repetitions (see He and Hu, 2002).  
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reflects the response of a typical firm to reductions in worker unemployment risk.  
The magnitudes of the regression coefficients indicate that the relation between UI benefits and 
corporate leverage is economically meaningful. For comparison, it is useful to benchmark the estimated 
UI effect, 1α , with the coefficient estimates for the financial control variables (unreported in Table 3 for 
brevity). Doubling the maximum total UI benefit has a similar relation with total leverage as increasing 
the proportion of fixed assets by 20 percentage points or increasing sales by 150%.8  Given that UI 
generosity varies by a factor of almost five between the most and least generous states, these magnitudes 
suggest that UI is quantitatively important in explaining average leverage.  
The value of the tax shield associated with the additional leverage provides another metric for 
establishing the economic magnitude of the relation between UI laws and corporate leverage. Based on 
the estimate from Column 4, doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated with 4.8 percentage 
points greater average leverage. If the average firm faces an interest rate of 10% and marginal tax rate of 
25% (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998), then the present value of the incremenal tax shield from 
increasing leverage by this amount in perpetuity totals approximately 1.2% of the firm’s assets’ value: 
4.8% increase in debt/assets * 10% interest rate * 25% marginal tax rate / 10% discount rate = 1.2% 
For example, for a $2 billion firm, this amounts to $24 million. Put another way, in 2008, the average 
Compustat firm had $245,000 in asset value per employee. Thus, the value of the incremenal tax shield 
associated with doubling the maximum total UI benefit amounts to about $300 in annual wage costs per 
employee, totaling almost $3,000 per employee in present value (i.e., 1.2% * $245,000). Although this 
calculation is only approximate (for example, it could be an overestimate because it ignores costs of 
financial distress), it provides a lower bound for the additional wages and benefits that workers require to 
work for a firm with 4.8 percentage points greater average leverage.9 
8 The coefficient on the proportion of fixed assets is 0.235, and the coefficient on the log of sales is 0.032. 
9 If UI benefits do not change, then the reason the firm does not increase its leverage ratio by 4.8% is 
presumably because the additional wages they would have to pay to compensate workers for the greater 
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The results are similar in specifications that use book leverage (instead of market leverage) as the 
dependent variable. Although market leverage is more closely tied to the theoretical hypothesis that firms 
optimally balance the tax shields of debt with the ex ante costs of worker unemployment risk 
compensation and the ex post costs of financial distress, many managers may focus on book leverage 
when making capital structure decisions (Graham and Harvey, 2002). As illustrated in Panel B of Table 3, 
book leverage increases by up to 4.0 percentage points when UI benefits are doubled. The impact of UI 
laws on book leverage is robust to controls for state macroeconomic conditions and firm financial 
characteristics, is stronger after excluding industries with dispersed workforces, and is similar in the 
median regression specification. The first-differences estimate is smaller, suggesting that the impact of UI 
benefits on book leverage takes longer than a year to be fully realized. These findings suggest that firms 
actively adjust leverage to account for worker unemployment risk. The results for book leverage also 
confirm that the observed increases in market leverage around UI law changes are not simply the result of 
changes in firms’ market values when UI benefits increase.  
Finally, although much of the academic literature on leverage focuses on the debt-to-assets ratio, 
for workers worried about their firm becoming distressed, another important measure of the firm’s 
financing policy is its interest coverage. Interest coverage, the ratio of operating earnings before 
depreciation to interest expense, measures the firm’s ability to use its current profits to cover the interest 
payments due on its outstanding debt. Measuring leverage by interest coverage ratios instead of debt 
ratios can lead to very different conclusions when a firm is expected to grow. Firms whose cash flows are 
expected to grow can have low leverage when measured on a debt-to-asset ratio basis (debt is low relative 
to future expected cash flows), but high leverage when measured on an interest coverage basis (required 
interest payments are large relative to current cash flows). The relation between UI benefits and interest 
coverage is presented in Panel C of Table 3.10   
risk is greater than the net tax shield and other benefits of the debt issue.  
10 Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we examine interest coverage in logs to account for the 
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We find that, when workers are eligible for greater UI benefits, firms maintain lower interest 
coverage ratios. The results are both economically and statistically significant: doubling the maximum 
total UI benefit is associated with 15% lower interest coverage (Column 1). The estimates are similar in 
specifications that control for local macroeconomic conditions (Column 2), that exclude industries with 
geographically dispersed workforces (Column 3), and that control for firm performance (Column 4). 
Results from regressions of first-differences, although not statistically different from the fixed effect 
results, are much smaller in magnitude, which suggests that interest coverage takes even longer time to 
adjust to UI benefit changes than other measures of leverage (Column 5). Finally, median regressions 
show large changes in interest coverage for the average firm in a given state-year (Column 6).  
Across all of the specifications in Tables 3, we find significant associations between changes in 
unemployment insurance benefit criteria and firms’ financing policies. Firms appear to increase total debt 
as a fraction of assets and maintain lower interest coverage when workers are eligible to receive higher 
benefits from state governments during unemployment. The empirical findings are consistent with the 
theory that firms boost their financial leverage when workers are better insulated from unemployment 
risk.  
 
5.2. Identification analysis 
One possible alternate explanation for the findings is that unobservable, local economic 
conditions, such as poor investment opportunities or a high risk of unemployment, lead states to adopt 
more generous UI laws and also lead firms to increase their borrowing. In this scenario, the relation 
between UI benefits and financial leverage could be spurious. We explore the empirical relevance of this 
relatively greater importance of equal percentage changes at lower levels of interest coverage. We code 
interest coverage equal to zero when earnings are negative (the ratio is otherwise not well defined) and 
take the natural log of one plus interest coverage as the variable of interest.  
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hypothesis in numerous ways and find evidence suggesting that this explanation is unlikely.11   
First, controls for local macroeconomic conditions have minimal effect on the estimated 
association between UI benefits and leverage (see Columns 2–6 of Table 3). In further tests with these 
controls, we divide the sample period at its midpoint and find remarkably similar results over time. An 
omitted variable that explains the findings would have to be uncorrelated with these indicators of local 
economic conditions and also have a consistent impact over time (despite changing macroeconomic 
environments).  
Second, we trace out the timing of the relation between UI benefit changes and financial leverage. 
If poor, unobserved economic conditions cause firms to increase leverage and induce legislators to raise 
UI benefits, then one should expect to see increases in leverage before benefits improve. In contrast to 
this hypothesis, however, Table 4 shows that the inclusion of controls for contemporaneous and forward 
values of UI benefits in leverage regressions does not attenuate the estimated correlation between lagged 
UI benefits and corporate leverage ratios. Moreover, the regression coefficients for UI benefits in the 
current and subsequent years that follow an observed change in leverage are trivial in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant. These results illustrate that increases in UI benefits are associated with 
subsequent increases in financial leverage and not vice versa, further mitigating the likelihood of omitted 
variable bias.      
[Insert Table 4 near here.] 
Third, we estimate heterogeneities in our main findings across numerous dimensions, such as 
labor market characteristics, that are consistent with causality. For an omitted variable to explain the 
results, in addition to being uncorrelated with our controls for local economic conditions, the omitted 
variable would have to be correlated with all of the various industry, worker, and firm characteristics for 
which we find a particularly strong relation between UI benefits and leverage. These analyses are 
11 In the interests of space, we present results only for market leverage. Similar results hold for book 
leverage and interest coverage.  
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discussed in detail in Subsections 5.3 and 5.4.  
Fourth, although most Compustat firms have relatively localized production facilities, the 
revenues of these large, publicly traded firms are typically spread across the country or the world. For 
such firms with national product markets, unobservable idiosyncratic changes in the economic conditions 
of the local areas in which they produce are unlikely to have much effect on their borrowing. These firms 
should illustrate no relation between UI benefits and leverage choices if the observed impact for the full 
sample is exclusively driven by omitted variables related to local economic conditions. Changes in 
national economic conditions affect the demand for their goods, which are sold nation- or worldwide, but 
these are captured by the year fixed effects.  
To evaluate the extent to which unobservable, local economic shocks impact our results, we 
gather data from the 2007 US Commodity Flow Survey (conducted by the US Bureau of the Census) and 
separate firms based on the fraction of total revenues realized from intrastate versus interstate 
transactions. If changes in UI laws are driven exclusively by changes in local economic conditions, then 
the relation between the laws and corporate borrowing should be greatest for firms that generate most of 
their sales from local, intrastate commerce. In contrast to this hypothesis, we find that the relation 
between UI generosity and corporate borrowing is as large, if not larger, for subsamples of firms in which 
a higher fraction of sales are generated out-of-state (results in Table 5). Even when the sample is 
restricted to industries with more than 85% of sales generated out-of-state, max total UI benefits are 
associated with a 6.0 percentage point increase in leverage (Column 6). 
[Insert Table 5 near here.] 
Fifth, we examine firms’ profits and find no signs of poor operating performance when benefits 
increase. Regression estimates of the relation between UI benefits and ROA are reported in Table 6. The 
specification in Column 1 controls for firm and year fixed effects, Column 2 adds controls for local 
macroeconomic conditions, Column 3 excludes industries with relatively dispersed workforces, and 
Column 4 includes controls for firm financial characteristics. Across all four specifications, the level of 
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UI benefits has no significant relation to firms’ operating performance.12  These results contradict the 
notion that unobserved economic conditions lead firms to increase their leverage at the same time that UI 
benefits improve. 
[Insert Table 6 near here.] 
Sixth, we undertake a falsification test in which we examine the relation between firms’ capital 
structures and the generosity of the UI systems in neighboring states. To the extent that a firm’s 
operations are concentrated in its headquarters’ state, the generosity of UI benefits in neighboring states 
should have no direct effect on the firm. However, if unobserved heterogeneity in regional economic 
conditions is the only determinant of UI benefit laws in the firm’s state, then benefit laws in bordering 
states are likely to be affected as well.   
We include bordering states’ benefit criteria as additional controls in Eq. (2). These controls 
would attenuate estimates of 1α  if unobserved economic conditions drive the UI law changes and 
leverage adjustments. To the contrary, the results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 illustrate that 
our estimates of the impact of UI benefits on corporate leverage are unaffected by these controls. The 
coefficient on log max total benefit is the same with and without controls for bordering states’ UI benefits 
(Columns 1 and 3). Furthermore, even when we exclude controls for the generosity of benefits in the 
firm’s home state, the relation between bordering states’ benefits and leverage is relatively small and 
statistically insignificant (Column 4). The relation between home state UI benefits and financing 
decisions, thus, does not appear to be driven by an omitted regional economic shock.13 
12 The coefficient estimates also suggest that the state economic indicators we include are effective 
controls for unobserved economic factors that could be associated with UI laws. For example, when 
focusing on firms whose workforces are likely locally concentrated, the estimated relation between UI 
benefits and ROA is less than 0.001 (see Column 3). 
13 Similar results are evident from an analysis of the specific historical episodes of clearly exogenous 
state UI law changes that we describe in Section 3. After California increased UI benefits by 43% in 
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Finally, the results are robust to using other measures of UI generosity. During periods of high 
unemployment, it is not uncommon for the government to adjust UI benefits by increasing the duration 
over which benefits can be drawn. The basic extended benefits program, which was enacted by Congress 
in 1970, provides up to 13 additional weeks of benefits when a state is experiencing high unemployment.  
To minimize concerns about omitted variables, we deliberately exclude these extended benefits from our 
calculations of maximum duration or total potential benefits used in this paper. In untabulated analyses, 
we also find that the correlations between maximum weekly benefits (or maximum duration) and 
financial leverage are similar to our main estimates.  
 
5.3. Importance of labor market and worker characteristics 
Our hypothesis suggests that increases in UI benefits impact corporate financing decisions 
through their effects on workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. Because workers face nontrivial costs 
from unemployment, they require a compensating premium in wages; this premium is lower when firms 
choose conservative financial policies that reduce the risk of financial distress and layoffs. Under this 
model, we would thus expect to find a stronger relation between UI benefits and corporate financial 
policies in industries in which labor unemployment risk is more relevant. This subsection evaluates this 
hypothesis by separately examining industries that differ along various dimensions that proxy for costly 
worker unemployment risk (see Appendix A for variable definitions). 
2002, median firm leverage increased by 5.6%. In contrast, bordering states did not significantly increase 
UI benefits (median increase in benefits was 1%), and the median change in leverage for firms in 
bordering states was -6.2%. After New York increased UI benefits by 36% in 1990, median firm leverage 
increased by 5.4%. Benefits in bordering states remained unchanged and median leverage increased by 
only 0.7%. Maine’s 12% increase in UI benefits in 2000 was mirrored by only a 5% increase in median 
UI benefits in bordering states. Maine firms increased leverage by a median rate of 13.9%, while the 
median firm in bordering states decreased leverage by 7%. 
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We first examine industries that vary in the degree of labor intensity in their production 
technologies. More labor-intensive firms face greater aggregate labor costs from increasing leverage 
because unemployment risks and the associated compensation levels are multiplied across a greater 
number of workers. Managers of firms that rely more heavily on human capital are thus more likely to 
take account of worker unemployment costs when making financing decisions.  
Second, we evaluate the impact of UI benefits in industries in which workforces exhibit varying 
degrees of UI payment recipiency. The speed with which workers are able to secure reemployment after a 
layoff varies across industries, perhaps due to heterogeneous search costs or the demand for specific 
skills. When workers find employment after a layoff, they are no longer eligible for benefits, and many 
workers who expect to find work quickly often do not take up benefits at all (Anderson and Meyer, 1997). 
Firms whose workers are more likely to claim UI benefits after a layoff are, thus, more sensitive to 
changes in UI laws when making financing decisions.  
Third, we exploit cross-industry heterogeneity in the propensity to lay off workers. Historical 
differences in the long-run propensity for layoffs likely result from structural differences, such as the 
variability of demand and flexibility of production technologies. To the extent that unemployment risk 
aversion is common across workers, it is likely that the effects of UI laws should be especially stark for 
industries with high layoff rates.   
Finally, we examine industries that employ large numbers of low-wage workers and industries in 
which a small fraction of workers own a home. Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2005) find that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI are concentrated among 
individuals who have few assets at the time of job loss. Chetty (2008) concludes that 60% of the increase 
in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to liquidity constraints instead of distortions in 
job search incentives. UI benefits are thus more likely to affect financing decisions in firms in which 
many workers receive low wages or most employees do not own homes, as these workers are likely to 
have limited savings and are especially vulnerable to liquidity constraints after job loss.  
 We separately estimate the impact of UI law changes on leverage for firms in industries that are 
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above and below the sample median for each of these types of characteristics (results in Table 7). The 
results for industries with greater (lower) expected worker unemployment costs are reported in Panel A 
(Panel B). While doubling UI benefits is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in leverage 
among firms in industries with above-median labor intensity (Column 1), it has a smaller effect on firms 
with low labor intensity (Column 6). The findings are similar whether we split firms on the basis of layoff 
propensities, UI payment frequencies, or percentages of workers who earn low wages or do not own a 
home.14  Although many of the differences across the samples are not individually statistically significant, 
the overall pattern of larger estimated relations in Panel A, relative to Panel B, supports the hypothesis 
that corporate leverage increases when unemployment risk becomes less costly for workers.        
[Insert Table 7 near here.] 
 
5.4. Importance of firm financial constraints  
 The relation between UI generosity and firms’ financial policies should, according to our 
hypothesis, also be stronger among financially constrained firms, ceterus paribus. Workers’ concerns 
about job loss are heightened when firms are unable to raise the external financing needed to buffer 
negative economic shocks, because many firms respond to performance declines by laying off workers 
(Ofek 1993; and John, Lang, and Netter, 1992). Increased unemployment risk due to financing frictions 
leads workers to require even higher wage premiums to stay at work and thus places strong pressure on 
firms to maintain conservative financial policies. UI benefits can ease this pressure by reducing workers’ 
expected costs of unemployment. To explore these implications, we group firms on the basis of 
14 One caveat is that other parameters could be correlated with the industry characteristics that we 
examine. For example, less risk-averse workers might join industries with high layoff rates, thereby 
weakening the link between UI benefits and leverage for these firms. Though the relative importance of 
these parameters is ultimately an empirical question, the broad scope of the results in Table 7 lends 
support to our hypothesis. 
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commonly used indicators for financial constraints and separately examine the relation between UI 
benefits and leverage for each group.  
We start by classifying firms based on their dividend policies. Firms that need to retain all of their 
capital are more likely to be financially constrained (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; and Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997). We also divide the sample on the basis of operating cash flows, as firms with low 
cash flows and pledgeable income typically find it difficult to raise external financing (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997), and on the basis of size, as smaller firms are thought to face tighter constraints (Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1994; and Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).15 
We separately estimate the impact of UI benefits on leverage for firms with above and below 
sample median measures of financial constraints (results in Table 8). The relation between UI generosity 
and financing is particulary strong for zero-dividend firms. A doubling of the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with a 6.1 percentage point increase in leverage (Panel A, Column 1), whereas firms that pay 
dividends and are less likely to be at risk of financial distress exhibit a weaker relation between UI 
benefits and leverage (Panel B, Column 4). The findings are similar when using the other indicators of 
financial constraints. 
[Insert Table 8 near here.] 
Collectively, these findings suggest that firms that face tighter financial constraints are more 
likely to take into account worker unemployment costs when setting financial policy, as limited access to 
external financing exacerbates workers’ unemployment risk during difficult economic times. These 
results further strengthen our conclusion that firms use conservative financial policies partly to mitigate 
worker exposure to unemployment risk.  
15 Firms that face financing constraints could also be different in other ways that affect leverage decisions. 
For example, if financially constrained firms are less profitable, they may enjoy fewer tax benefits from 
increased leverage.  
 27 
                                                 
6. Alternate mechanisms 
6.1. Pure cash flow effect 
We also consider alternate explanations for our findings. As described in Section 3, firms pay 
premiums for their workers’ unemployment insurance. When UI benefits increase, firms’ premium costs 
increase as well. With less money to pay back debt, these additional costs could weaken firms’ financial 
positions, increasing leverage and reducing cash and corporate liquidity.  
This hypothesis, however, is rejected by the data. As Table 6 indicates, ROA (a proxy for 
profitability) does not decrease significantly when states increase their UI benefits.  It is perhaps not 
surprising that UI benefits do not reduce a firm’s resources on net. Although premium costs increase, 
workers require less compensation for unemployment risk. In fact, if workers are risk averse and UI 
premiums are actuarially fair, then more generous unemployment benefits would make firms better off.  
6.2. Strategic leverage 
Another possibility is that UI benefit laws affect financial policy by impacting workers’ outside 
options. If greater UI benefits raise the reservation utility of employed workers, then the wage bargaining 
position of workers could improve, potentially leading firms to raise leverage as means of maintaining a 
tougher bargaining stance with employees (Bronars and Deere, 1991; and Matsa, 2010). The financial 
policies associated with increases in UI benefits could, therefore, reflect changes in the worker–firm 
bargaining environment, instead of changes in workers’ unemployment risk. 
Unemployment insurance benefits are, however, unlikely to raise the reservation utility of 
employed workers.  An individual who refuses to work because his employer denied him a raise would 
almost always be ineligible for UI benefits. One exception, however, is for unionized employees in select 
states. Although eligibility rules generally exclude striking workers from collecting UI benefits, many 
states allow those unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment insurance benefits 
under specific (but rare) conditions. 
To evaluate whether the corporate financial policies associated with UI benefit increases reflect 
changes in the worker–firm bargaining environment, we repeat our analysis separately for industries with 
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high and low union presence. We classify industries on the basis of the percentage of their workforce 
covered by collective bargaining agreements in 1983.16 The bargaining hypothesis predicts that the 
relation between UI generosity and corporate financial policies should be concentrated among firms in 
highly unionized industries. In contrast, we find the relation between UI benefits and leverage to be 
equally strong among firms in low union industries. Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated 
with a 5.2 percentage point increase in leverage in industries with high union coverage (standard error 
2.5) and a 4.9 percentage point increase in industries with lower union coverage (standard error 2.0). 
These results are further reinforced by Hamermesh and Wolf (1990), who find that unionized workers do 
not receive larger compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk, presumably because 
unionization is not necessary for workers to receive compensatory wages in full.  We conclude that the 
connection between UI and leverage does not appear to be driven by worker bargaining. 
 
7. Estimates of indirect costs of financial distress 
Our analysis thus far measures the impact of partially reducing workers’ unemployment risk on 
firms’ capital structures through changes in state UI benefit laws. Because UI typically replaces at most 
half of a worker’s wages, even workers facing a generous UI system still demand a modest wage 
premium for bearing residual unemployment risk. To measure the full impact of unemployment risk on 
firms’ financing decisions, this section develops numerical estimates for the present value of excess labor 
costs associated with leverage choices. These measures capture the ex ante, indirect costs of financial 
distress that are related to labor unemployment risk.  
To estimate these costs, we use default probabilities for each credit rating from Altman (2007) 
and the wage premium paid per unit of unemployment risk from Topel (1984). For each credit rating, we 
16 Industries with at least 25% (less than 25%) of workers covered by collective bargaining are classified 
as high union (low union). Data on union coverage are from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) and matched 
to standard industrial classifications using US Bureau of the Census (1989). 
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calculate the additional labor costs that are required to compensate workers for their expected loss in 
utility should the firm default. For this calculation, the key missing information is the unemployment risk 
that is associated with financial distress. We calculate the probability of being laid off conditional on 
default using information on bond defaults from 1977 to 2008 and Compustat.17  For each default, we 
gather employment data from Compustat and calculate the percentage change in employment in a window 
from one year before to one year after the default event.18  For issuers with multiple defaults, we analyze 
employment changes around the first event. The results are reported in Table 9, Panel A. 
[Insert Table 9 near here.] 
Among the 283 defaulting firms for which employment data are available, employment decreases 
by approximately 27% in the two years surrounding default. On average, about half of the decrease occurs 
in the year before default. These estimates are lower bounds because employment reductions are likely to 
be greater among firms that delist after default and have missing employment data in Compustat. Of such 
firms, 31 enter bankruptcy. Hotchkiss (1995) finds that the median firm that enters bankruptcy suffers a 
50% reduction in employment between the last fiscal year prior to bankruptcy and the first fiscal year 
after emerging. Applying this estimate in our sample (and dropping the remaining firms with missing 
data), the average decrease in employment around default is 29%.  
To verify that our measures of employment change are related to financial distress, not economic 
distress, we also examine the contemporaneous change in employment among a matched sample of 
Compustat firms with similar economic performance within the same two-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) industry as each defaulting issuer. Specifically, for each defaulting firm, we identify a 
corresponding firm in the same industry with the closest matching ROA in the year prior to default.  
These matched sample employment changes capture average workforce adjustments that are primarily 
17 The default data are from the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default Master Database. 
18 Compustat data allow us to calculate net changes in employment near a default event.  If these firms are 
also hiring employees during the period, our estimates understate the gross flow out of employment. 
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related to economic distress (under the assumption that economic distress affects each matched set of 
firms equally).19  As reported in Panel A, the average (median) matched sample firms’ employment 
change is +3.8% (0%) in the years surrounding default.  The estimates across various windows show little 
sign of economic distress causing layoffs among matched firms. In fact, the positive employment growth 
among matched firms suggests that we could even be underestimating employment changes related to 
financial distress.20 
When a firm increases leverage, it increases the probability of default and exposes workers to a 
greater probability of job loss. Topel (1984) finds that, for every additional percentage point in 
unemployment risk, average equilibrium wages increase by 0.93%. This effect is moderated by the 
unemployment insurance system; Topel (1984) estimates that compensating wage differentials would 
increase to 2.5% in the absence of UI benefits. The average value of the compensating wage premium, ω , 
per dollar of assets is given by applying the average firm’s labor intensity and capitalizing the annual 
wage premium, i.e.,  
 
pr
A
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A D +
Π
=
υω
, (3) 
where p is the probability of default, υ  is the probability of unemployment conditional on default, Π is 
the per unit required wage premium, L is labor expense, A is the market value of assets, and rD is the 
expected return on debt.21   
19 Indeed, the differences in the firms’ average and median ROA are statistically insignificant.  
20 The results are similar when we also limit the control sample to firms with zero leverage.  
21 We use the historical default probability (Altman, 2007) and spread over Treasuries (Almeida and 
Philippon, 2007) associated with each credit rating. The average ratio of annual labor expenses to market 
value of assets in Compustat from 1950 through 2008 is 25.6%. Following Almeida and Philippon (2007) 
and others, we assume that the firm maintains a constant leverage ratio (and wage premium) until it 
defaults, at which point future wage premiums, distress costs, and tax shields are zero. 
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Estimates of compensating wage premiums are presented in Panel B of Table 9. While wage 
premiums among highly rated firms are minimal (e.g., about 4 basis points of firm value for an AA-rated 
firm), they are substantially larger among more highly levered firms. For example, a BBB rating, which 
corresponds to a leverage ratio of about 0.33 (see Molina, 2005), requires a firm to pay about 57 basis 
points of firm value in additional wages in the presence of UI and about 154 basis points in the absence of 
UI compensation.  For a BB rating (leverage ratio of about 0.46), these figures jump to about 112 basis 
points with UI (301 basis points without UI).22  These estimates indicate that wage premiums for 
unemployment risk constitute substantial indirect costs of increasing financial leverage. 
The results in Panel B provide a lower bound for the compensating wage premium, as our 
employment figures do not capture layoffs that occur in financial distress in the absence of default. 
Estimates of employment changes near default, reported in Panel A of Table 9, show that firms reduce 
employment by 16% in the year before default. Distressed firms that are able to avoid default likely 
reduce employment as well. The full impact of distress-related unemployment risk is, therefore, higher 
than these estimates imply.  
For comparison, we also present estimates of expected ex post costs of financial distress and 
marginal tax benefits, as reported by Almeida and Philippon (2007, Table VI), based on estimates from 
Altman (1984), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Graham (2000), Molina (2005), and their own analysis.  
Using risk-neutral default probabilities, a BBB rating is associated with ex post financial distress costs of 
about 4.53% of firm value. The tax benefits associated with a BBB rating are about 5.18% of firm value. 
The difference between estimated debt tax shields and ex post risk-adjusted costs of financial distress is 
about 0.65% of firm value. For a BBB-rated firm, our estimates indicate that ex ante compensating wage 
22 The results in Panel B are also useful for inferring the magnitudes of marginal increases in 
compensating wage premia as firms increase leverage.  For example, a firm moving from an A rating to a 
BBB rating must incur an additional cost of 51 basis points in firm value to compensate workers for 
bearing greater unemployment risk.   
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premiums account for almost 90% of the difference between tax shields and ex post costs of financial 
distress (i.e., 0.57% of the 0.65% in firm value).23  Optimal capital structures are thus likely more 
conservative than indicated by previous research.    
Overall, the results show that the total wage premium tied to unemployment risk and associated 
with financial leverage represents a significant cost to shareholders. Furthermore, the size of this 
compensation grows as firms increase leverage and reduce workers’ job security. The estimates indicate 
that labor unemployment risk is an important determinant of firms’ capital structures, particularly when 
government-provided unemployment insurance compensation is limited and workers are poorly insured 
against costly layoff spells. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the impact of workers’ unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions. 
Exploiting variation in unemployment insurance benefit levels as shocks to worker unemployment costs, 
we find that reductions in labor unemployment risk are associated with increases in corporate leverage. 
Estimates indicate that the average wage compensation for unemployment risk totals about 60 basis points 
23 These figures are also consistent with the regression estimates reported in Section 5.  For an optimizing 
firm with an A rating, a 4.8 percentage point increase in leverage in response to a doubling of UI benefits 
(Table 3, Panel A, Column 4) would decrease the firm’s rating to BBB (Molina, 2005) and yield 
additional tax savings of about 0.78% and risk-adjusted distress costs of about 0.69% (Almeida and 
Philippon, 2007).  The additional net gain of 0.09% implies that worker’s compensating wages would 
increase from 0.06% to 0.15% of firm value.  Applying this wage figure to Eq. (3) implies that workers’ 
required premium for each percentage point of unemployment risk (Π ) decreases from 0.93% to 0.24% 
when UI benefits double.  This figure is in line with the wage premium–UI benefit relation estimated by 
Topel (1984), who finds the premium to be 2.5% when there is no unemployment insurance, 0.93% when 
there are average UI benefits, and 0% when UI provides complete wage replacement.  
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of firm value for a BBB-rated company. The impact of unemployment risk is particularly strong for firms 
in industries in which layoffs occur with high frequency, for firms that operate with greater labor 
intensity, and for firms that face tight financial constraints.  
The findings illustrate that companies choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of 
mitigating workers’ exposure to unemployment risk, supporting models such as Titman (1984) and Berk, 
Stanton, and Zechner (2010). Reducing leverage decreases the probability that a firm will encounter 
financial distress and subject workers to costly layoffs. By reducing leverage, managers are able to lower 
the wage bill required by workers as compensation for bearing unemployment risk.  
More broadly, the evidence emphasizes that labor market frictions are an important feature of the 
corporate environment. Debt policy is but only one of many ways for firms to mitigate workers’ 
unemployment risk. Firms can also reduce the probability of distress by taking less risky projects 
(Hennessy and Whited, 2005) or reduce workers’ losses in distress by redesigning job tasks to require 
fewer firm-specific skills (Jaggia and Thakor, 1994). Exploring the implications of unemployment risk on 
additional corporate policies is an important area for future research. 
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Appendix A. Data definitions for subsample analysis (Subsection 5.3) 
Labor Intensity: Ratio of labor and pension expenses to sales in Compustat. Measure is based on 
the three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) over the full sample period. 
UI Payment Rates: Fraction of workers in the March Current Population Survey that received 
income from unemployment insurance. Measure is based on two-digit SIC over all years the data are 
available (1988–2008).  
Layoff Propensity: Average annual fraction of workers separated from work as part of a mass 
layoff. Measure uses data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) “Mass Layoff Statistics” and the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and is based on three-digit NAICS over all of the years in which 
the data are available (1996–2008).  
We count the number of workers who are separated from their jobs during extended mass layoffs, 
which is defined by the BLS as when at least 50 initial claims are filed against an establishment during a 
consecutive five-week period and at least 50 workers have been separated from their jobs for more than 
30 days. For each industry-year, we take the ratio of such separations to total industry employment (from 
the BEA) and then obtain the industry layoff separation rate by taking the simple average of these ratios 
over the full sample period.  
A listing of the layoff separation rate in each industry is presented in Appendix Table A1. The 
average layoff separation rate is 1.5% (median is 0.8%), subject to substantial variation across industries. 
Separation rates are less than 0.1% in seven industries, including real estate, various health care services, 
and auto parts dealers. The highest separation rates are in agriculture and forestry support activities 
(18.4%), passenger ground transportation (5.9%), and heavy construction (5.7%).  
[Insert Table A1 near here.] 
Low-wage Workers: Percentage of workers who earn less than $50,000 in annual income. 
Measure is based on three-digit NAICS and the 2000 US population census.  
Using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, we confirm that households with annual 
income less than $50,000 (in 1999 dollars) have significantly less financial wealth and liquid assets, 
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relative to households with annual income greater than $50,000. The median household with annual 
income less than $50,000 has financial assets worth 1.56 months of income, and the median household 
with higher income has financial assets worth 4.63 months of income. Financial assets in this calculation 
include the sum of all liquid assets (checking and savings accounts, money market deposit accounts, 
mutual funds, and stocks), bonds (savings, government, and corporate), cash value of life insurance, and 
other managed assets, such as trusts and annuities, but exclude retirement savings and real estate wealth. 
Income is defined as the sum of all wage, salary, and investment income.  
Given that the US average historical unemployment duration between 1950 and 2008 was 3.2 
months (BLS Series ID LNU03008275), these figures suggest that workers who earn less than $50,000 
annual income are in a particularly difficult position when they become unemployed.  The minimum 
income required to qualify for maximum UI benefits is typically well below $50,000 (in 1999 dollars), so 
these workers are impacted by changes in UI benefit ceilings. 
Employee Home Ownership: Percentage of workers that own a home. Measure is based on three-
digit NAICS and the 2000 US population census.  
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Fig. 1. Cross-industry correlation between the layoff separation rate and market leverage, 2008.
This figure plots average market leverage in 2008 against the long-run average layoff
separation rate at the two-digit North American Industry Classification System level. Market
leverage is total debt divided by the market value of the firm (data from Compustat). The layoff
separation rate is the ratio of workers affected by extended mass layoffs to total industry
employment and is based on data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics "Mass Layoff
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Fig. 2. Relative increases in state maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefits by decade, 1950–2009. This figure displays the
quartile of a state's increase in maximum total benefits, relative to other states in each decade from 1950 to 2009. Larger increases in
benefits are shown in darker shades. Maximum total benefits is the product of the statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the
maximum duration and is based on information from annual issues of the US Department of Labor’s "Significant Provisions of State UI
Laws."
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Fig. 3. Distribution of state increases in maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefits over
each decade, 1950–2009. This figure plots the distribution of state increases over each decade
from 1950 to 2009 in the the maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s
unemployment insurance system. The maximum potential benefit is calculated as the product of
the statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum duration and is based on
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information from annual issues of the US Department of Labor’s "Significant Provisions of State
UI Laws." In all, there are 306 state-decade observations, including the District of Columbia.  
Fig. 4. Average market leverage and the log of maximum unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits by state, 1950–2008. This figure plots average annual state residuals from regressions
of market leverage and log max total benefits on year fixed effects from 1950 to 2008. Results
for each of the six largest US states are reported. Market leverage is total debt divided by the
market value of the firm (data from Compustat). Log max total benefits is the natural log of the
product of the statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum duration and is based on
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Table 1 
Summary statistics
Mean
Standard 
deviation 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Total debt / market value 0.304 0.254 0.085 0.247 0.475
Total debt / book value 0.285 0.251 0.114 0.245 0.388
Log interest coverage 1.891 1.415 0.936 1.821 2.639
Panel A: Dependent variables
Panel B: Unemployment insurance variables
The sample consists of 127,233 firm-year observations from 1950 to 2008. The unemployment
insurance (UI) benefit criteria are from annual issues of the US Department of Labor’s "Significant
Provisions of State UI Laws," the financial data are from Compustat, the state unemployment rates are
calculated from the Current Population Survey (available with complete state indicators starting in 1977),
and the state gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The sample includes all firms (excluding financials and utilities) with non-missing observations for the
variables shown below. Log interest coverage is the natural log of one plus the ratio of operating earnings
before depreciation to interest expense, where the variable is recoded to zero for observations with
negative earnings. Compustat variables are winsorized at 1% tails.
Log max total benefitt-1 8.514 0.633 8.086 8.629 8.962
Log max weekly benefitt-1 5.243 0.629 4.828 5.361 5.704
Log max durationt-1 3.272 0.049 3.258 3.258 3.258
Proportion of fixed assets 0.317 0.217 0.149 0.272 0.442
Log sales 4.620 2.218 3.201 4.624 6.121
Return on assets 0.020 0.323 0.023 0.087 0.139
Z-score 1.008 5.016 1.059 2.103 2.865
Market-to-book ratio 2.171 4.143 0.752 1.413 2.604
Unemployment rate 6.383 1.943 5.019 6.174 7.472
GDP growth 6.768 3.439 4.510 6.417 8.734
Panel C: Control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefit 0.891*** 0.896***
(0.128) (0.107)
Log max weekly benefit 1.009*** 1.009***
(0.131) (0.107)
Log max duration 0.484** 0.645**
(0.232) (0.251)
Unemployment rate 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.068***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Log state unemployment insurance payments
Table 2
Unemployment insurance laws and total state benefit payments
This table summarizes the results from state-panel regressions of the natural log of total state unemployment
insurance (UI) compensation payments on variables representing the generosity of state UI benefit criteria and a set of
controls. Controls in all regressions include state and year fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include the state
unemployment rate and the state gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at
the state level, are reported in parentheses. ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
GDP growth -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.027***
-0.005 -0.005 -0.006
Number of observations 2,040 2,040 2,040 1,632 1,632 1,632
R 2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.91
Fixed effects
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.045
*** 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.030** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010)
Number of observations 127,233 106,059 87,160 87,160 77,446 1,588
R2 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.11 0.64
Log max total benefitt-1 0.024
*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 0.012* 0.031***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of observations 127,233 106,059 87,160 87,160 77,446 1,588
R2 0 58 0 59 0 59 0 68 0 16 0 50
Panel A: Total debt / market value
Panel B: Total debt / book value
Table 3
Unemployment insurance laws and firms' capital structures
This table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of total debt divided by assets (market value
in Panel A, book value in Panel B) and log interest coverage (Panel C) on the natural log of the maximum total
potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment insurance system in the previous year, and a set of
controls. Controls in all regressions include year fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include firm fixed
effects, state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and state gross domestic product growth rate),
and firm financial controls (proportion of fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log of sales, modified
Altman Z-score, and return on assets). Where indicated, industries are excluded in which a large percentage
of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely, retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard
errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. OLS = ordinary least squares.
. . . . . .
Log max total benefitt-1 -0.154
** -0.124* -0.150* -0.131* -0.042 '-0.381
***
(0.060) (0.067) (0.085) (0.068) (0.068) (0.052)
Number of observations 127,233 106,059 87,160 87,160 77,446 1,588
R 2 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.12 0.54
Sample
Level of aggregation Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year State-year
Exclude dispersed industries No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables
State economic indicators No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls No No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS First-
differences
Median 
regression
Panel C: Log interest coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.048
*** 0.040*** 0.047***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
Log max total benefitt 0.009
(0.019)
Log max total benefitt+1 0.005
(0.019)
L t t l b fit 0 020 0 025
Table 4
Falsification tests: timing of capital structure changes and unemployment insurance (UI) laws in bordering
states
This table summarizes the results from falsification tests. Column 1 reproduces the baseline results.
Column 2 reports firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by the market value
of the firm) on one-year lagged, contemporaneous, and one-year forward values of the natural log of the
maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of
controls. Coumns 3 and 4 report firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage on the natural log of the
maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s UI system in the previous year, the median of the
natural log of the maximum total potential benefit available under the UI systems in bordering states, and
the controls. Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects, state economic indicators (state
unemployment rate and state gross domestic product growth rate), and firm financial controls (proportion of
fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log of sales, modified Altman Z-score, and return on assets).
Industries are excluded in which a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically
dispersed, namely, retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state
level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
og max o a  ene t-1 , . .
  bordering states median (0.027) (0.028)
Number of observations 87,160 75,445 87,039 87,039
R 2 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65
Control variables
State economic indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full sample
Sales data 
not missing
Interstate 
sales > 70%
Interstate 
sales > 75%
Interstate 
sales > 80%
Interstate 
sales > 85%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.048
*** 0.041* 0.046* 0.048* 0.047* 0.060***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021)
Number of observations 87,160 61,503 58,913 57,774 51,851 30,840
Table 5 
Impact of unemployment insurance laws by geography of sales, national versus local
This table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by the
market value of the firm) on the natural log of the maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s
unemployment insurance system in the previous year, and a set of controls. Each column corresponds to different
sample restrictions based on the geographic breakdown of sales in the firms' industry, specifically the percent of the
value of product shipments in the firm's three-digit North American Industry Classification System industry sent to
destinations in a different US state and is based on the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey. Controls in all regressions
include firm and year fixed effects, state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and state gross domestic
product growth rate), and firm financial controls (proportion of fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log of sales,
modified Altman Z-score, and return on assets). Industries are excluded in which a large percentage of the workforce is
likely to be geographically dispersed, namely, retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering
at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
R 2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63
Control variables
State economic indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max total benefitt-1 -0.013 -0.004 0.000 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Number of observations 127,233 106,059 87,160 87,160
R 2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.74
Exclude dispersed industries No No Yes Yes
Control variables
State economic indicators No Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls No No No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6 
Unemployment insurance laws and firms' operating performance
This table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of return on assets on the
natural log of the maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment
insurance system in the previous year, and a set of controls. Controls in all regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include state economic
indicators (state unemployment rate and state gross domestic product growth rate), and firm
financial controls (proportion of fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log sales, modified
Altman Z-score, and return on assets). Where indicated, industries are excluded in which a
large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely, retail,
wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are
reported in parentheses. None of the reported estimates are statistically significant at the
10% level.
More labor intensive High UI payment rates
High layoff separation 
rates More low-wage workers
Low employee home 
ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.047
*** 0.055*** 0.046** 0.056*** 0.062***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015)
Table 7 
Impact of unemployment insurance (UI) laws by importance of unemployment risk
Panel A: Industries with greater expected worker unemployment costs
This table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by the market value of the firm) on the natural log
of the maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment insurance system in the previous year, and a set of controls. Panel A restricts
the sample to industries with greater expected worker unemployment costs (above median labor intensity, above median proportion of workers to collect UI
benefits, above median layoff separation rate, above median proportion of workers earning less than $50,000 per year, or below median proportion of workers
who own a home), and Panel B restricts the sample to industries with lower expected worker unemployment costs (below median labor intensity, below median
UI payments, below median layoffs, below median low wage, or above median home ownership). Labor intensity is measured as the ratio of labor and pension
expense to sales (data from Compustat). The proportion of workers collecting unemployment insurance payments is from the Current Population Survey, in
which industries are defined at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification level. The layoff separation rate is measured as the ratio of workers affected by
extended mass layoffs to total industry employment and is based on data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics "Mass Layoff Statistics" and the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The proportion of low-wage workers and the proportion of home ownership are calculated from the 2000 US population census. Other than
for the UI payments, industries are defined at the three-digit North American Industry Classification System level. Controls in all regressions include firm and year
fixed effects, state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and state gross domestic product growth rate), and firm financial controls (proportion of fixed
assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log of sales, modified Altman Z-score, and return on assets). Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Less labor intensive Low UI payment rates
Low layoff separation 
rates Fewer low-wage workers
High employee home 
ownership
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.028 0.023 0.037* 0.032 0.016
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022)
Control variables
State economic indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Industries with lower expected worker unemployment costs
Zero dividends Low cash flows Small firms
(1) (2) (3)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.061
*** 0.061** 0.047**
(0.022) (0.026) (0.022)
Table 8
Impact of unemployment insurance laws by importance of financial constraints
Panel A: Firms that face greater financial constraints
Panel B: Firms that face weaker financial constraints
This table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt
divided by the market value of the firm) on the natural log of the maximum total potential benefit
available under the state’s unemployment insurance system in the previous year, and a set of
controls. Panel A restricts the sample to firms that face greater financial constraints (zero dividends,
below median operating cash flows, or below median total assets), and Panel B restricts the sample
to firms facing fewer financial constraints (positive dividends, above median operating cash flows, or
above median total assets). Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects, state
economic indicators (state unemployment rate and state gross domestic product growth rate), and
firm financial controls (proportion of fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, natural log of sales, modified
Altman Z-score, and return on assets). Industries are excluded in which a large percentage of the
workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely, retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard
errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Positive dividends High cash flows Large firms
(4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefitt-1 0.022
* 0.035*** 0.029
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Control variables
State economic indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm financial controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Period (years) Mean Standard error Minimum Maximum
Defaulting firms
[-1,+1] 283 -0.27 0.02 -0.30 -0.23
[-1 0] 362 -0 16 0 01 -0 19 -0 14
Table 9
Estimates of compensation for unemployment risk by credit rating
Panel A: Employment changes around default (percent of employment)
95% confidence intervalNumber of 
observations
This table presents estimates of the ex ante wage costs of firm leverage decisions. Panel A contains
statistics that describe employment changes in various windows (measured in years) around default for firms
in the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default Master Database (1977 to 2008). Employment
changes among comparison firms are also reported, where the comparison firms are the firm with the most
similar ratio of operating profit (before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) to assets in the
defaulting firm's two-digit Standard Industrial Classification industry in the year before the default. Panel B
presents estimates of wage premium, ω, as a percent of the market value of assets, A, required to
compensate workers for unemployment risk across various credit ratings and is based on the formula
where p is the probability of default, υ is the probability of unemployment conditional on default, Π is the per
unit required wage premium, L is labor expense, and rD is the expected return on debt. The first column
excludes employment changes for bankrupt firms in estimating p. The second and third columns assume a
50% reduction in employment for bankrupt firms for which employment data are unavailable. The second
(third) column presents average compensating wage premiums assuming mean (no) UI wage replacement.
The fourth and fifth columns present risk-adjusted ex post costs of financial distress and the tax benefits of
debt for each credit rating as reported by Almeida and Philippon (2007, Table VI).
,
pr
A
Lp
A D 



, . . . .
[0,+1] 286 -0.13 0.01 -0.16 -0.10
Comparison firms
[-1,+1] 283 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.11
[-1,0] 362 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.06
[0,+1] 286 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05
Credit rating With UI Without UI
AAA 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.47
AA 0.04 0.05 0.13 1.84 2.51
A 0.05 0.06 0.16 3.84 4.40
BBB 0.53 0.57 1.54 4.53 5.18
BB 1.03 1.12 3.01 6.81 7.22
B 1.46 1.59 4.28 9.54 8.95
Panel B: Costs and benefits of leverage (percent of firm value)
Costs of financial 
distress
Tax benefits 
of debt
Almeida and Philippon (2007)Wage premium
Including bankruptciesExcluding 
bankruptcies
Industry NAICS
Layoff separation 
rate (percent)
Agriculture and forestry
Forestry and logging 113 0.8
Agriculture and forestry support activities 115 18.4
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
Oil and gas extraction 211 0.3
Mining, except oil and gas 212 2.8
Support activities for mining 213 1.3
Utilities 221 0.5
Construction
Construction of buildings 236 1.2
Heavy and civil engineering construction 237 5.7
Specialty trade contractors 238 0.6
Manufacturing
Food manufacturing 311 4.4
Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 312 2.1
Textile mills 313 3.7
Textile product mills 314 1.7
Apparel manufacturing 315 4.5
Table A1
Layoff separation rates by three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry
This table lists layoff separation rates for three-digit NAICS industries. The layoff separation rate is the ratio
of workers affected by extended mass layoffs to total industry employment, based on data from the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) "Mass Layoff Statistics" and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Extended
mass layoffs are defined by the BLS as when at least 50 initial claims are filed against an establishment
during a consecutive five-week period and at least 50 workers have been separated from their jobs for more
than 30 days.
Leather and allied product manufacturing 316 4.4
Wood product manufacturing 321 1.9
Paper manufacturing 322 1.4
Printing and related support activities 323 0.8
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 324 2.6
Chemical manufacturing 325 0.8
Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 326 1.3
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 327 2.4
Primary metal manufacturing 331 3.0
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 332 0.9
Machinery manufacturing 333 1.6
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 334 2.3
Electrical equipment and appliance manufacturing 335 2.6
Transportation equipment 336 4.1
Furniture and related product manufacturing 337 1.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 1.1
Retail trade
Motor vehicle and parts dealers 441 0.1
Furniture and home furnishings stores 442 0.4
Electronics and appliance stores 443 0.7
Building material and garden supply stores 444 0.5
Food and beverage stores 445 0.7
Health and personal care stores 446 0.2
Gasoline stations 447 0.1
Clothing and clothing accessories stores 448 0.4
Sporting goods, hobby, book, and music stores 451 0.3
General merchandise stores 452 1.4
Miscellaneous store retailers 453 0.1
Nonstore retailers 454 1.0
Industry NAICS
Layoff separation 
rate (percent)
Transportation and warehousing
Air transportation 481 2.2
Water transportation 483 3.5
Truck transportation 484 0.4
Transit and ground passenger transportation 485 5.9
Pipeline transportation 486 2.7
Scenic and sightseeing transportation 487 2.1
Support activities for transportation 488 0.5
Couriers and messengers 492 0.7
Warehousing and storage 493 0.4
Information
Publishing industries, except Internet 511 0.5
Motion picture and sound recording industries 512 3.6
Broadcasting, except Internet 515 0.5
Telecommunications 517 0.9
Data processing, hosting and related services 518 0.7
Other information services 519 1.1
Finance and insurance
Credit intermediation and related activities 522 0.8
Securities, commodity contracts, investments 523 0.2
Insurance carriers and related activities 524 0.3
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 525 0.3
Real estate and rental and leasing
Real estate 531 0.0
Rental and leasing services 532 0.2
Professional, scientific, and technical services 541 0.4
Management of companies and enterprises 551 0.2
Administrative and waste services
Administrative and support services 561 1.0
Waste management and remediation services 562 0.4
Educational services 611 0.1
Health care and social assistance
Ambulatory health care services 621 0.1
Hospitals 622 0.2
Nursing and residential care facilities 623 0.1
Social assistance 624 0.7
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Performing arts and spectator sports 711 0.8
Museums, historical sites, zoos, and parks 712 0.5
Amusement, gambling, and recreation 713 1.8
Accommodation and food services
Accommodation 721 1.2
Food services and drinking places 722 0.4
Other services, except public administration
Repair and maintenance 811 0.1
Personal and laundry services 812 0.1
Membership associations and organizations 813 0.2
Table A1
Layoff separation rates by three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry (cont.)
